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Based on the controlled order rearrange encryption (CORE) for quantum key dis-
tribution using EPR pairs[Fu.G.Deng and G.L.Long Phys.Rev.A68 (2003) 042315],
we propose the generalized controlled order rearrangement encryption (GCORE)
protocols of N qubits and N qutrits, concretely display them in the cases using
3-qubit, 2-qutrit maximally entangled basis states. We further indicate that our
protocols will become safer with the increase of number of particles and dimensions.
Moreover, we carry out the security analysis using quantum covariant cloning ma-
chine for the protocol using qutrits. Although the applications of the generalized
scheme need to be further studied, the GCORE has many distinct features such as
great capacity and high efficiency.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Keywords: quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, controlled order rearrange-
ment encryption, maximally entangled state, covariant quantum cloning machine
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is an art of providing secure communication over insecure communication
channels. Now, in the information community, the safety of transmission of secret infor-
mation is getting more and more important. One essential theme of secure communication
is to distribute secret keys between sender and receiver. Quantum cryptography (QC) is
secure based on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics rather than classical cryp-
tography. An important application of QC is the quantum key distribution (QKD), which
∗Electronic address: caoy1209@mail.ustc.edu.cn
2concerns the generation and distribution of secret key between two legitimate users. The
security of key distribution is the most important part in the secret communication. QKD
exploits quantum mechanics principles for the secret communication, which provides a se-
cure way for transmitting the key. So far, there are many quantum secret key protocols such
as BB84 protocol, Ekt91, B92, six-state protocol etc.[1-5], and some new quantum secret
key protocols [6-12] are continually suggested.
The security of some QKD protocols in Refs.[1,2,3,6,10-14] are based on random choices
of different measuring-base, so the randomness is usually a useful ingredient in QC. The
security of other some QKD protocols in Refs.[7,8,15-17] lies on the nonlocality nature of
quantum systems. Goldenberg-Vaidman scheme [7] first presents QKD protocol by two
transmission lines. This protocol uses orthogonal states and has full efficiency, all the parti-
cles transmitted are used to generate secret keys. Then, Koashi-Imoto protocol [8] improves
Goldenberg-Vaidman scheme by using an asymmetric interferometer to reduce the time
delay. However, two factors lead that these schemes’ time delay can not be too short. Sub-
sequently, F.G.Deng and G.L.Long propose a controlled order rearrange encryption (CORE)
scheme [9] to overcome this drawback and realize a secure QKD. In the nonlocality based
QKD protocols, orthogonal quantum states are used. Security is assured by not allowing an
eavesdropper such as Eve to acquire both parts simultaneously.
Actually, the CORE technique is implemented not only suitable to use Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pairs, but also suitable to use other quantum information carriers (QICs) [9].
In recent years researchers have drawn their attentions to the QKD protocols that involve
multilevel systems with two parties, or multiple parties with two-level systems. A pursuit
motivation of multilevel QKD is that more information can be carried by each particle
thereby the information flux is increased, and some multilevel protocols have been shown
to have greater security against eavesdropping attacks than their qubit-based countparts
[16,18,19]. Thus, the use of multi-particle maximally entangled state can guarantee the
security further and has higher efficiency in general.
In this paper, our main purpose is to generalize the CORE of QC to multi-particle
and/or high dimension quantum systems. Our generalized protocols can be thought of
having higher efficiency because the generalized protocols, which is called as the GCORE of
QC here, exploit the facts that a possible eavesdropper with no access to the whole quantum
system at the same time, cannot recover the whole information without being detected, and
3the protocols employ a larger alphabet, a few-dimensional orthogonal basis of pure state.
Consequently, we obtain the full efficiency from this point of view. The generalized protocols
also have great capacity based on the reason thatM adopted N - qudit maximally entangled
states can send M log2 d
N bits of information in our schemes if we assume there are N
particles with each being d dimension.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec.II, we simply review the CORE protocol using
EPR pairs provided by Fu.G.Deng and G.L.Long. Then we generalize the CORE protocol
to N -qubit case, specially, we present the GCORE protocol using 3-qubit state and check its
security by the correlated matrix method. In Sec.III, the GCORE protocol using N qutrits
is proposed, GCORE protocol using 2-qutrit is presented in detail. Moveover, we discuss
the security of qutrit GCORE using the quantum covariant cloning machine. In Sec.IV, we
present a uniform expression of multi-particle and/or high dimension situation. Advantages
of GCORE are analogized and concluding remarks are given.
II. GCORE USING N-QUBIT MAXIMALLY ENTANGLED BASIS STATES
A. Explanation of CORE protocol
At the beginning, let us review briefly the meaning of CORE. Assume the keys are
distributed between Alice and Bob. Before transmission, Alice rearranges the order of cor-
related particles and sends them to Bob. The aim of random rearrangement is to prevent
the eavesdropper obtaining correlated particles simultaneously from different transmission
channels as possible as they can, and we also need an evening process to make transmis-
sion in equal time intervals. Once Bob receives these particles, he restores the order of the
particles and undoes Alice’s operations by synchronizing their measure devices using repeat-
edly a prior shared control key, so that he can make orthogonal basis measurement. The
measurement outcome is exactly what Alice has prepared. The essence of CORE is use of
a a control key as has been used in the modified BB84 scheme [6]. The noncloning nature
ensures it viable.
The whole process of CORE protocol using EPR states [9] has been demonstrated clearly
in Ref.[9]. In the following contexts, we generalize it to multi-particle and high-dimensional
cases, hence the generalized protocol is denoted as GCORE.
4B. GCORE protocol using GHZ-basis states
In the following, we firstly discuss concrete GCORE example using 3-qubit GHZ-basis
states without loss of generalization.
(i) Alice generates a sequence of GHZ-basis states (a1, b1, c1), · · · , (am, bm, cm) randomly,
where (ai, bi, ci) denotes one GHZ-basis state (1 ≤ i ≤ m,m is an integer) and every eight
adjoining triplets are taken as one unit of QICs. Without loss of generality, we consider the
first carrier unit [(a1, b1, c1), (a2, b2, c2), · · · , (a8, b8, c8)] which are randomly in eight GHZ-
basis states that can be expressed as [20]:
∣∣ψ±j 〉 = 1√
2
(|j〉AB |0〉C ± |3− j〉AB |1〉C) , (1)
where j = j1j2 denotes binary notations. In their explicit forms, eight GHZ-basis states
reads:
∣∣ψ+0 〉 = (|000〉+ |111〉) /√2∣∣ψ−0 〉 = (|000〉 − |111〉) /√2∣∣ψ+1 〉 = (|010〉+ |101〉) /√2∣∣ψ−1 〉 = (|010〉 − |101〉) /√2∣∣ψ+2 〉 = (|100〉+ |011〉) /√2∣∣ψ−2 〉 = (|100〉 − |011〉) /√2∣∣ψ+3 〉 = (|110〉+ |001〉) /√2∣∣ψ−3 〉 = (|110〉 − |001〉) /√2) (2)
we indicate them by 000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, and 111, respectively.
(ii) Alice sends the three parts out in equal time intervals to Bob through three channels.
Before these GHZ-basis states enter into the insecure transmission channel, their orders are
rearranged by the GCORE system. Here are eight choices of GCORE operations, corre-
sponding relations are the following:
E0 ↔ 000, E1 ↔ 001, E2 ↔ 010, E3 ↔ 011
E4 ↔ 100, E5 ↔ 101, E6 ↔ 110, E7 ↔ 111
and the GCORE is done for eight GHZ-basis states. Let us use permutation group notation
to express them as following
5E0 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8


= (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
E1 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 1 4 3 6 5 8 7


=
(
1 2
)(
3 4
)(
5 6
)(
7 8
)
E2 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 1 2 7 8 5 6


=
(
1 3
)(
2 4
)(
5 7
)(
6 8
)
E3 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
4 3 2 1 8 7 6 5


=
(
1 4
)(
2 3
)(
5 8
)(
6 7
)
E4 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4


=
(
1 5
)(
2 6
)(
3 7
)(
4 8
)
E5 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


=
(
1 8
)(
2 7
)(
3 6
)(
4 5
)
E6 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
7 8 5 6 3 4 1 2


=
(
1 7
)(
2 8
)(
3 5
)(
4 6
)
E7 =

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
6 5 8 7 2 1 4 3


=
(
1 6
)(
2 5
)(
3 8
)(
4 7
)
we also show this protocol using Fig.1.
Three quantum channels in this GCORE protocol are denoted upper, middle, and lower
channel. The upper QIC parts are transmitted according to their temporal orders. A control
key is used to rearrange the order of middle and lower QIC parts. For instance, the value of
control key is 000, the operation E0 is applied. In Fig. 2 there are seven switches, the order
of eight GHZ-basis states is unchanged with switch 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 in position (up, up, up,
up, up, up, down). When the value of control key is 001, the operation E1 is performed, and
it is done by putting the seven switches into position(down, up, up, up, up, up, down), (up,
up, up, up, up, down,up), (down, up, up, up, up, up, down), (up, up, up, up, up, down,up),
(down, up, up, up, up, up, down), (up, up, up, up, up, down,up), (down, up, up, up, up, up,
down), (up, up, up, up, up, down,up) for eight particles, respectively. In fact, five switches
are enough. When the operation E1 is performed, it is done by putting the five switches
into position(down, down, up, up, down), (up, down, up, down, up), (down, down, up, up,
down), (up, down, up, down, up), (down, down, up, up, down), (up, down, up, down, up),
(down, down, up, up, down), (up, down, up, down, up) for eight particles, respectively. The
6FIG. 1: Example of GCORE using GHZ-basis states. There are eight different GCORE operations.
effect of using seven switches is the same as that of using five switches. Similar combination
can be written explicitly for operations E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7.
Up channel
Down channel
Seven switches
Five switches
Up channel
Down channel
FIG. 2: Devices to perform GCORE operations, the loop represents a time delay of a fixed interval.
(iii) Bob undoes the effect of order rearrangement. At Bob’ site, he just exchanges upper,
middle, and lower parts of Alice’s GCORE apparatus and the GCORE operations performed
by Alice will be undone. (iv) Bob measures these carrier units to obtain the key. After these
7particles are dearranged. Bob uses the GHZ-basis measurement to read out the information
determinatively, which is exactly the same as Alice prepared one because the measurement
here is orthogonal basis measurement and obviously the eight GHZ-basis states are mutually
orthogonal.
Remark: To prevent Eve from stealing, we need an evening process to ensure the same
time interval between different batches of QICs travel. Now, we need three transmission
lines to ensure the application of current proposed scheme because 3-qubit GCORE uses
GHZ-basis state, and each particle transmitted through a quantum transmission line in
equal time interval. It is obviously different from the case using two-transmission lines in
Refs.[7,8]. Detailed analysis will be presented in subsection C below. In addition, the control
keys can be used to control the GCORE operation of a group of units to reduce resources.
For example, instead of using 001 controls GCORE operation of one unit of QICs (eight
GHZ-basis states), we can use 001 to control more units of QICs consecutively, say 4 units
or 32 GHZ-basis states.
C. Security of GCORE using GHZ-basis states
Let us look at the security of GCORE using 3-qubit GHZ-basis states. Eve has only
1/8 chance to guess the right GCORE operation for the eight GHZ-basis states. If she
uses a wrong GCORE operation, the three particles measured by her will be anticorrelated.
Firstly we assume that A particle from the first GHZ-basis state, B particle from the second
GHZ-basis state and C particle from the third GHZ-basis state are mistreated by Eve as a
GHZ-basis state, then the density operator will be
ρA1B2C3 = ρ˜A1 ⊗ ρ˜B2 ⊗ ρ˜C3 =


1
2
0
0
1
2

⊗


1
2
0
0
1
2

⊗


1
2
0
0
1
2

 = 1
8
I8×8 (3)
where ρ˜A1 = TrB1C1 (ρA1B1C1) , ρ˜B2 = TrA2C2 (ρA2B2C2) , ρ˜C3 = TrA3B3 (ρA3B3C3). When
ρA1B2C3 is measured in the GHZ-basis state, the result can be any one of eight GHZ-basis
states with 12.5% probability each. Thus Eve will introduce 66.99% error rate in the results.
Then we assume A particle from the first GHZ-basis state, B and C particles from the second
8GHZ-basis state are mistreated by Eve as a GHZ-basis state, the density operator will be
ρA1B2C3 = ρ˜A1 ⊗ ρ˜B2C3 =


1
2
0
0
1
2

⊗


1
2
0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0
1
2


(4)
Eve will introduce 76.56% error rate in these results. In both situations, Alice and Bob can
detect Eve easily by checking a sufficiently large subset of results randomly chosen. Surely,
Eve can perform a generalized Bell inequality measurement on the particles, but it is useless
for decrypting the control key. Let us choose ~a (ax, ay, az), ~b (bx, by, bz), as the directions of
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements, at the same time, ~c (cx, cy, cz) is also Bob’s measurement
direction. Then the correlation operator can be written as following:
Eˆ = (σˆ · ~a)⊗ (σˆ ·~b)⊗ (σˆ · ~c) (5)
where σx =

 0 1
1 0

 , σy =

 0 −i
i 0

 , σz =

 1 0
0 −1

. The expectation values
〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ
= 〈ψ| (σˆ · ~a) ⊗ (σˆ · ~b) ⊗ (σˆ · ~c) |ψ〉 are different for the different GHZ-basis
states. They are〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ+
0
= (ax − iay) (bx − iby) (cx − icy) + (ax + iay) (bx + iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ−
0
= − (ax − iay) (bx − iby) (cx − icy)− (ax + iay) (bx + iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ+
1
= (ax − iay) (bx + iby) (cx − icy) + (ax + iay) (bx − iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ−
1
= − (ax − iay) (bx + iby) (cx − icy)− (ax + iay) (bx − iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ+
2
= (ax + iay) (bx − iby) (cx − icy) + (ax − iay) (bx + iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ−
2
= − (ax + iay) (bx − iby) (cx − icy)− (ax − iay) (bx + iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ+
3
= (ax + iay) (bx + iby) (cx − icy) + (ax − iay) (bx − iby) (cx + icy)〈
E
(
~a,~b,~c
)〉
ψ−
3
= − (ax + iay) (bx + iby) (cx − icy)− (ax − iay) (bx − iby) (cx + icy) (6)
Note their coefficients are 1/2.
For the product states |000〉 , |001〉 , |010〉 , |011〉 , |100〉 , |101〉 , |110〉 , |111〉, the expected
values are:
azbzcz, −azbzcz, −azbzcz, azbzcz, −azbzcz, azbzcz, azbzcz, −azbzcz (7)
9respectively. If Eve takes general Bell inequality measurements on the three uncorrelated
particles, she will get 0 for a large number of measurements when the particles are randomly
distributed among the eight GHZ-basis states. If Eve does take three correlated particles,
she will also get 0 when eight GHZ-basis states are taken with the equal probability. So
Eve gets nothing about the control key except for guessing it randomly. Because the control
key can be repeatedly used, the probability that Eve guesses the right control key is
(
1
2
)3Nk ,
where 3Nk is the number of bits in the control key. When Nk = 100, the probability is(
1
8
)100
, which is practically zero. Naturally, GCORE protocol is suitable to N-qubit setting
scenario, too. N -qubit maximally entangled basis states are defined as following [20]:
∣∣ψ±j 〉 = 1√
2
(|j〉 |0〉 ± ∣∣2N−1 − j − 1〉 |1〉) (8)
where j = j1j2 · · · jN−1 denotes binary notations. Then there are 2N different control keys,
2N operations corresponding to E0, E1, · · ·E2N−1 , and we need N quantum channels with
2N
2
+1 = 2N−1+1 switches each. The eavesdropper Eve only guesses the right N -GHZ-basis
states with probability 1
2N
, as the density operation is ρAB···N = 12N I2N×2N .
III. GCORE USING N-QUTRIT MAXIMALLY ENTANGLED BASIS STATES
One of the motivations of considering a high dimensional system for QKD is to increase
the information per particle. Another context where using higher-dimension space might be
advantageous is the key growing. However, the practical limitations might be more severe in
realistic high-dimension cryptosystems, in particular the influence of the detector’s quantum
efficiency and dark count rate [21,22]. This has been discussed in the related Ref.[23]. Here,
we start to consider the qutrit quantum system.
A. GCORE protocol using 2-qutrit general Bell-basis states
Here, let’s consider the simplest scenario, two particles, each particle has three levels, i.e.
a 2-qutrit system. On the whole, concrete four processes are similar to analysis in Sec.II.B.
The recapitulation is presented in the following. As we know, the general Bell-basis states
can be written as [24]:
|ψnm〉 =
∑
j
e2piij/3 |j〉 ⊗ |j +m mod 3〉 /
√
3 (9)
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where n,m, j = 0, 1, 2, the explicit expressions are then
|ψ00〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉) /
√
3
|ψ10〉 =
(|00〉+ e2ipi/3 |11〉+ e4ipi/3 |22〉) /√3
|ψ20〉 =
(|00〉+ e4ipi/3 |11〉+ e2ipi/3 |22〉) /√3
|ψ01〉 = (|01〉+ |12〉+ |20〉) /
√
3
|ψ11〉 =
(|01〉+ e2ipi/3 |12〉+ e4ipi/3 |20〉) /√3
|ψ21〉 =
(|01〉+ e4ipi/3 |12〉+ e2ipi/3 |20〉) /√3
|ψ02〉 = (|02〉+ |10〉+ |21〉) /
√
3
|ψ12〉 =
(|02〉+ e2ipi/3 |10〉+ e4ipi/3 |21〉) /√3
|ψ22〉 =
(|02〉+ e4ipi/3 |10〉+ e2ipi/3 |21〉) /√3 (10)
It is clear that these states are orthogonal. They can be presented by 00, 01, 02, 10, 11, 12,
20, 21, 22, respectively. It can be shown that single-body operators Uij (i, j = 0, 1, 2) will
transform |ψ00〉 into the corresponding other eight states. The expressions of these operators
are:
U00 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 ;U10 =


1 0 0
0 e2pii/3 0
0 0 e4pii/3

 ;U20 =


1 0 0
0 e4pii/3 0
0 0 e2pii/3


U01 =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0

 ;U11 =


0 0 e4pii/3
1 0 0
0 e2pii/3 0

 ;U21 =


0 0 e2pii/3
1 0 0
0 e4pii/3 0


U02 =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

 ;U12 =


0 e2pii/3 0
0 0 e4pii/3
1 0 0

 ;U22 =


0 e4pii/3 0
0 0 e2pii/3
1 0 0

 (11)
The GCORE operations using qutrit states are similar to the cases in Sec.II. However, there
are nine choices of GCORE operations, corresponding relations are the following
E0 ↔ 00, E1 ↔ 01, E2 ↔ 02
E3 ↔ 10, E4 ↔ 11, E5 ↔ 12
E6 ↔ 20, E7 ↔ 21, E8 ↔ 22
11
and the GCORE is done for every nine general Bell-basis states. These operations are
denoted by the denotation of permutation group.
E0 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9


=
(
1 1
)(
2 2
)(
3 3
)(
4 4
)(
5 5
)(
6 6
)(
7 7
)(
8 8
)(
9 9
)
E1 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 2


=
(
1 2
)(
2 3
)(
3 4
)(
4 5
)(
5 6
)(
6 7
)(
7 8
)(
8 9
)(
9 1
)
E2 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2


=
(
1 3
)(
2 4
)(
3 5
)(
4 6
)(
5 7
)(
6 8
)(
7 9
)(
8 1
)(
9 2
)
E3 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3


=
(
1 4
)(
2 5
)(
3 6
)(
4 7
)(
5 8
)(
6 9
)(
7 1
)(
8 2
)(
9 3
)
E4 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4


=
(
1 5
)(
2 6
)(
3 7
)(
4 8
)(
5 9
)(
6 1
)(
7 2
)(
8 3
)(
9 4
)
E5 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5


=
(
1 6
)(
2 7
)(
3 8
)(
4 9
)(
5 1
)(
6 2
)(
7 3
)(
8 4
)(
9 5
)
E6 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6


=
(
1 7
)(
2 8
)(
3 9
)(
4 1
)(
5 2
)(
6 3
)(
7 4
)(
8 5
)(
9 6
)
E7 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7


=
(
1 8
)(
2 9
)(
3 1
)(
4 2
)(
5 3
)(
6 4
)(
7 5
)(
8 6
)(
9 7
)
12
E8 ==

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8


=
(
1 9
)(
2 1
)(
3 2
)(
4 3
)(
5 4
)(
6 5
)(
7 6
)(
8 7
)(
9 8
)
the permutation has been shown clearly in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 gives the main device to perform
GCORE operation by a specific instance.
FIG. 3: Example of GCORE using 2-qutrit Bell-basis states; There are nine different GCORE
operations
Down channel
Up channel
FIG. 4: Devices to perform GCORE operations, the loop represents a time delay of a fixed interval.
According to Fig. 4, the upper QIC parts are transmitted according to their temporal
order. A control key is used to rearrange the order of the lower QIC parts. For instance, the
value of control key is 00, the operation E0 is applied. In Fig. 4 there are five switches, the
order of nine general Bell-basis states is unchanged with switch 1,2,3,4 and 5 in position (up,
up, down, up, up ). When control key is 01, E1 is performed, and it is done by putting the
nine switches into position (down, down, up, up, down ), (up, down, up, up, up ), (up, down,
13
up, up, up ), (up, down, up, up, up ), (up, down, up, up, up ), (up, down, up, up, up ), (up,
down, up, up, up ), (up, down, up, up, up ), (up, down, up, up, up ) for the nine particles,
respectively. Similar combination can be written explicitly for E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8.
Now we can consider the cases of multi-particle and/or high-dimension quantum systems.
Firstly the method is generalized to high dimension quantum system (d > 3) of two particles.
Note that the d-dimension Bell-basis states in a symmetric channel [8, 21, 23] are expressed
as
|ψnm〉 =
∑
j
e2piijn/d |j〉 ⊗ |j +m mod d〉 /
√
d (12)
where n,m, j = 0, 1, · · ·d− 1. The unitary operator is
Unm =
∑
j
e2piijn/d |j +m mod d〉 〈j| (13)
which can transfer d-dimension Bell-basis state
|ψ00〉 =
∑
j
|j〉 ⊗ |j〉 /
√
d (14)
to other d-dimension Bell-basis state |ψnm〉, i.e. Unm |ψ00〉 = |ψnm〉. So we can use the
same method like 2-qutrit GCORE to analyze this problem completely. Thus, we have
presented the GCORE of two-particle high dimensional generalization, we will give multi-
particle situation next. At first, we consider a less complicated three particle quantum
system. For 3-qutrit quantum system, its generalized maximally entangled basis states are :
∣∣ψknm〉 =∑
j
e2piijk/3 |j〉 ⊗ |j + n mod 3〉 ⊗ |j +m mod 3〉 /
√
3 (15)
where n,m, k = 0, 1, 2, the explicit expressions are then
∣∣ψ000〉 = (|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉) /√3∣∣ψ001〉 = (|001〉+ |112〉+ |220〉) /√3∣∣ψ002〉 = (|002〉+ |110〉+ |221〉) /√3
· · ·∣∣ψ222〉 = (|022〉+ e4ipi/3 |100〉+ e2ipi/3 |222〉) /√3 (16)
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There are 27 corresponding GCORE operations, denoted by:
E0 ↔ 000, E1 ↔ 001, E2 ↔ 002, E3 ↔ 100, E4 ↔ 101, E5 ↔ 102, E6 ↔ 200,
E7 ↔ 201, E8 ↔ 202, E9 ↔ 010, E11 ↔ 011, E11 ↔ 012, E12 ↔ 110, E13 ↔ 111,
E14 ↔ 112, E15 ↔ 210, E16 ↔ 211, E17 ↔ 212, E18 ↔ 020, E19 ↔ 021, E20 ↔ 022,
E21 ↔ 120, E22 ↔ 121, E23 ↔ 122, E24 ↔ 220, E25 ↔ 221, E26 ↔ 222
(17)
Due to the complication of GCORE operations, more resources are needed, and the analysis
of security also becomes more complicated. But the maximal advantage is the swell of secu-
rity. And the probability that Eve guesses the right control key is near 0. The corresponding
fig. 5 is given below.
FIG. 5: (a). Example of GCORE using 3-qutrit maximally entangled basis states; (b). Devices to
perform GCORE operations, the loop represents a time delay of a fixed interval.
Generally, a uniform expression of N -qutrit maximally entangled basis state can be ex-
pressed as the following form
|ψNi1,i2,··· ,iN−1〉 =
∑
j
e2piijN/3|j〉 ⊗ |j + i1 mod 3〉 ⊗ |j + i2 mod 3〉
⊗ · · · ⊗ |j + iN−1 mod 3〉/
√
3 (18)
where i1, i2 · · · iN = 0, 1, 2. Similar analysis can be given, but there is a little difference. In
short, there are 3N different control keys, 3N operations corresponding to E0, E1, · · ·E3N−1,
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and we need N quantum channels with 3N−1 + 1 switches each. The eavesdropper only
guesses the right general Bell-basis state with probability 1
3N
, as the density operation is
ρAB···N = 13N I3N×3N .
B. Security of GCORE using 2-qutrit general Bell-basis states
Now, let us look at the security of above GCORE protocol using 2-qutrit states. Eve has
only 11.1% chance to guess the right GCORE operation for nine general Bell-basis states. If
she uses a wrong GCORE operation, the two particles she measured will be anticorrelated.
Assume that A particle from the general Bell-basis state, B particle from the second general
Bell-basis state are mistreated by Eve as a general Bell-basis state, then the density operator
will be
ρA1B2 = ρ¯A1 ⊗ ρ¯B2 =


1
3
0 0
0
1
3
0
0 0
1
3

⊗


1
3
0 0
0
1
3
0
0 0
1
3

 =
1
9
I9×9 (19)
where ρ¯A1 = TrB1 (ρA1B1) , ρ¯B2 = TrA2 (ρA2B2) .
The result indicates that any one of the nine general Bell-basis states appears with 11.1%
probability each. Thus Eve will introduce 79.01% error rates in the results. Alice and Bob
can detect Eve easily by checking a sufficiently large subset of results randomly chosen.
Surely, Eve can take the generalized Bell inequality measurement on the particles, but it is
useless for decrypting the control key. There are eight (Hermitian) generators of SU (3), i.e.
eight Gell-Mann matrices, which are defined by


0 1 0
1 0 1
0 1 0

 ,


0 −i 0
i 0 0
0 0 0

 ,


1 0 0
0 −1 0
0 0 0

 ,


0 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 0




0 0 −i
0 0 0
i 0 0

 ,


0 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0

 ,


0 0 0
0 0 −i
0 i 0

 ,
1√
3


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 −2


Let us choose directions ~M and ~N as the directions of measurement of Alice and Bob
respectively, these measurements satisfy the orthogonal relations. The correlation operator
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can be written as:
Eˆ = Sˆ · ~M ⊗ Sˆ · ~N (20)
The expectation values
〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ
= 〈ψ| Sˆ · ~M ⊗ Sˆ · ~N |ψ〉 are not equal for different
general Bell-basis states.
〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ00
=
2
3

M1N1 −M2N2 +M3N3 +M4N4 −M5N5
+M6N6 −M7N7 +M8N8


〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ01
=
1
3

 2M4N1 + 2M5N2 −M3N3 −
√
3M8N3 + 2M6N4
+2M7N5 + 2M1N6 − 2M2N7 +
√
3M3N8 −M8N8


〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ02
=
1
3

 2M6N1 − 2M7N2 −M3N3 +
√
3M8N3 + 2M1N4
+2M2N5 + 2M4N6 + 2M5N7 −
√
3M3N8 −M8N8


〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ10
= −1+i
√
3
3
M1N1 − −1+i
√
3
3
M2N2 +
1−i√3
6
M3N3 +
√
3+i
6
M8N3
− 1+i
√
3
3
M4N4 +
1+i
√
3
3
M5N5 +
2
3
M6N6 − 23M7N7
+
√
3+i
6
M3N8 − 1−i
√
3
6
M8N8〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ11
= −1+i
√
3
3
M4N1 − 1+i
√
3
3
M5N2 − 13M3N3 − i3M8N3
+ 2
3
M6N4 +
2
3
M7N5 +
−1+i√3
3
M1N6 +
1−i√3
3
M2N7
− i
3
M3N8 +
1
3
M8N8〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ12
= 2
3
M6N1 − 23M7N2 + 1+i
√
3
6
M3N3 −
√
3−i
6
M8N3
− 1−i
√
3
3
M1N4 − 1−i
√
3
3
M2N5 − 1+i
√
3
3
M4N6
−1+i
√
3
3
M5N7 −
√
3−i
6
M3N8 − 1+i
√
3
6
M8N8〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ20
= −1+i
√
3
3
M1N1 +
1+i
√
3
3
M2N2 +
1+i
√
3
6
M3N3 +
√
3−i
6
M8N3
− 1−i
√
3
3
M4N4 +
1−i√3
3
M5N5 +
2
3
M6N6 − 23M7N7
+
√
3−i
6
M3N8 − 1+i
√
3
6
M8N8〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ21
= −1+i
√
3
3
M4N1 +
−1+i√3
3
M5N2 − 13M3N3 + i3M8N3
+ 2
3
M6N4 +
2
3
M7N5 − 1+i
√
3
3
M1N6 +
1+i
√
3
3
M2N7
+ i
3
M3N8 +
1
3
M8N8〈
E
(
~M, ~N
)〉
ψ22
= 2
3
M6N1 − 23M7N2 + 1−i
√
3
6
M3N3 −
√
3+i
6
M8N3
− 1+i
√
3
3
M1N4 − 1+i
√
3
3
M2N5 − 1−i
√
3
3
M4N6
−1−i
√
3
3
M5N7 −
√
3+i
6
M3N8 − 1−i
√
3
6
M8N8
(21)
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For product states |00〉 , |01〉 , |02〉 , |10〉 , |11〉 , |12〉 , |20〉 , |21〉 , |22〉, the expected values are
(
M3 +
M8√
3
)(
N3 +
N8√
3
)
,
(
M3 +
M8√
3
)(
−N3 + N8√
3
)
, −
(
M3 +
M8√
3
)
N8√
3
,
(
−M3 + M8√
3
)(
N3 +
N8√
3
,
)
,
(
M8√
3
−M3
)(
N8√
3
−N3
)
,− 2√
3
(
−M3 + M8√
3
)
N8,
− 2√
3
(
N3 +
N8√
3
)
N8,− 2√
3
(
−N3 + N8√
3
)
M8,
4
3
M8N8
respectively. Subsequently, it’s easy to give the similar analysis like CORE using EPR pairs.
The experimental realization about qutrit for quantum cryptography is important. Up
to now, the experiment has achieved much progress to realize the production of general
Bell-basis state [25,26]. For example, in order to produce the state
|ψ00〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉+ |22〉) /
√
3 (22)
one uses a unbiased six-port beam splitter [27] which is a device with the following property:
if a photon enters any single input port (out of the three ports), there is equal probability
that it leaves one of the three output ports to produce state. In fact, one can always construct
a special six-port beam splitter with the distinguishing trait that the elements of its unitary
transition matrix, T , are solely powers of the complex number, α = exp(i2pi
3
), namely,
Tkl =
1√
3
α(k−1)(l−1). It has been shown in Ref.[22] that any six-port beam splitter can be
constructed from the above-mentioned one by adding appropriate phase shifters at its exit
and input ports (and by a trivial relabeling of the output ports). The phase shifters in front
of the input ports of beam splitter can be tunable and used to change the phase of the
incoming photon.
C. Security analysis of qutrit GCORE using the quantum cloning machine
From now on, we will analyze the security of qutrit GCORE against individual attacks
(where Eve monitors the qutrit separately). So far, a lot work about the analysis of security
for BB84 or generalized BB84 protocol using cloning machine have been done [18,19,28].
These workers are significative. Fortunately, GCORE protocols are also propitious to analyze
using these methods. For this case, we consider a fairly general class of eavesdropping attack
based on (not necessarily universal) quantum cloning machine. It is known that such a
cloning-based attack is the optimal eavesdropping strategy, that is, the best Eve can do is
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to clone (imperfectly) Alice’s qubit and keep a copy while sending the original to Bob [18].
An appropriate measurement of the clone (and the ancilla system) after disclosure of the
basis enables Eve to gain the maximally possible information on Alice’s key bit.
We use a general class of cloning transformations which is defined in Refs.[18,19], the
resulting joint state of the two clones (noted A and B) and of the cloning machine (noted
C) is
|ψ〉 →
N−1∑
m,n=0
am,nUm,n |ψ〉A |Bm,−n〉B,C
=
N−1∑
m,n=0
bm,nUm,n |ψ〉B |Bm,−n〉A,C (23)
where
Um,n =
N−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kn/N) |k +m〉 〈k| (24)
Um,n forms a group of qudit error operators, generalizing the Pauli matrices for qubit: m
labels the shift errors (extending the bit flip σx), while n labels the phase errors (extending
the phase flip σz). And
|Bm,n〉 = N− 12
N−1∑
k=0
e2pii(kn/N) |k〉 |k +m〉 (25)
with 0 ≤ m,n ≤ N − 1. Equation |Bm,n〉 defines the N2 generalized Bell states for a pair of
N -dimensional systems. The final states of clone A, B are
ρA =
N−1∑
m,n=0
pm,n |ψm,n〉 〈ψm,n| =
N−1∑
m,n=0
pm,nUm,n |ψ〉 〈ψ|U †m,n
ρB =
N−1∑
m,n=0
qm,n |ψm,n〉 〈ψm,n| =
N−1∑
m,n=0
qm,nUm,n |ψ〉 〈ψ|U †m,n (26)
In addition, the weight functions of the two clones are related by
pm,n = |am,n|2 , qm,n = |bm,n|2 (27)
where am,n, bm,n are two (complex) amplitude functions that are dual under a Fourier trans-
form:
bm,n =
1
N
N−1∑
x,y=0
e2pii(nx−my)/Nam,n (28)
19
Assume that Eve clones the qutrit state that is sent to Bob. Then Eve will measure her
clone in the same basis as Bob and her ancilla in the conjugate basis. For deriving Eve’s
information, we need first to rewrite the cloning transformation of these bases. If Alice sends
any state |k〉 in the computational basis, the phase errors clearly do not play any role in the
mixture ρB, so the fidelity can be expressed as:
F = 〈k| ρB |k〉 =
N−1∑
n=0
|a0,n|2 (29)
In the rest of this subsection, we will use this general characterization of cloning in order
to investigate the state-dependent cloning of qutrit. Alice sends the input state |ψ〉 belonging
to a 3-dimensional space. For the cloner to copy equally well the states of computational
bases, we choose the amplitude am,n characterizing the cloner, which must be of the form
(am,n) =


v x x
y y y
z z z

 (30)
such a cloner is phase covariant, which means it acts identically on each state of the com-
putational base.
The fidelity of the first clone (the one that is sent to Bob) when copying a state |ψ〉 can
be written, in general, as
FA = 〈ψ| ρA |ψ〉 =
N−1∑
m,n=0
|am,n|2 |〈ψ| ψm,n〉|2 =
N−1∑
m,n=0
|〈ψ|Um,n |ψm,n〉|2 (31)
That is FA = v
2 + y2 + z2. The Disturbances DA1and DA2of the first clone are:
DA1 = DA2 = x
2 + y2 + z2 (32)
By view of equation
bm,n =
1
N
N−1∑
x,y=0
e2pii(nx−my)/Nam,n (33)
we can obtain that, for the second clone, which is the maximum when y = z, and the fidelity
is given by
FB =
(
v2 + 2x2 + 12y2 + 8xy + 4vy
)
/3 (34)
Again, we get the same disturbances (minimal when y = z) given by
DB1 = DB2 =
(
v2 + 2x2 + 3y2 − 4xy − 2vy) /3 (35)
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For simplicity, it’s natural to consider the following amplitude matrix [19]
(am,n) =


v x x
x x x
x x x

 (36)
where v, x are real parameters that satisfy the normalization condition v2 + 8x2 = 1. It’s
easy to check that this cloner’s results in the same fidelity and same disturbance for any
qutrit state:
F = v2 + 2x2 D1 = D2 = 3x
2 (37)
Of course we have the relation: F +D1 +D2 = 1. We can easily know that the symmetric
universal qutrit cloner is characterized by a fidelity of 3/4. Now, it is simple to analyze its
security against an incoherent attack. Bob’s fidelity is F = v2 + 2x2 and the corresponding
mutual information between Alice and Bob (if the latter measures his clone in the good
basis) [18] is given by
IAB = log2 3 + F log2 F + (1− F ) log2
1− F
2
(38)
since two possible errors are equiprobable. The cloning fidelity for Eve is given by
FE =
(v + 8x)2 + 2 (v − x)2
9
(39)
Maximizing Eve’s fidelity using the normalization relation v2 + 8x2 = 1 yields the optimal
cloner
x =
√
F (1− F )
2
, v = F (40)
The corresponding optimal fidelity for Eve is
FE =
F
3
+
2
3
(1− F ) + 2
3
√
2F (1− F ) (41)
Let us see how Eve can maximize her information on Alice’s state. If Alice sends the state
|k〉 (k = 0, 1, 2), then it is clear that Eve can obtain Bob’s error simply by performing a
practical Bell measurement (measuring only the m index) on BC. In order to infer Alice’s
state, Eve must distinguish between three states (|0〉 , |1〉 , |2〉) with a same scalar product
3F−1
2
for all pairs of states, regardless of the measured value of m. Consequently, Eve’s
information [18] is
IAE = log2 3 + FE log2 FE + (1− FE) log2
1− FE
2
(42)
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As a result, Bob’s and Eve’s information curves intersect exactly where the fidelities
coincide. That is, at F = FE =
1
2
(
1 + 1√
3
)
.
FIG. 6: Relation between fidelity and mutual information in which real curve represents mutual
information between Alice and Eve; the dashed curve represents mutual information between Alice
and Bob.
Due to a theorem given by Csiszar and Korner [21], which provides a lower bound on
the secret key rate. Concretely, it is sufficient that IAB > IAC in order to establish a secret
key with a nonzero rate, if the one-way communication on the classical channel is used, this
is actually a necessary condition. Consequently, the GCORE protocols cease to generate
secret key bits precisely at the point where Eve’s information attains Bob’s information.
We compute the disturbance Dqutrit = 1 − F = 12
(
1− 1√
3
)
(or error rate) at which
IAB = IAE (or F = FE), that is, above which Alice and Bob can not distill a secret key
any more by use of one–way privacy amplification protocol. While the disturbance for the
protocol using qubit is Dqubit =
1
2
(
1− 1√
2
)
, we can see Dqubit < Dqutrit easily. Thus we say
that disturbance increases with the dimension, suggesting mutual information between Alice
and Eve of qutrit cryptosystem is getting smaller than that of qubit cryptosystem under
the same condition. In other words, Eve obtains less information in the qutrit scheme. Our
analysis thus confirms a seemingly general property that qutrit scheme for QKD to be more
robust against eavesdropping than the corresponding qubit scheme.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
For m particles and/or higher dimension quantum systems, we can provide the uniform
expression of maximally entangled basis states. Assume the number of particle is n, each
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dimension is d, the maximally entangled basis states are
∣∣ψni1,i2,···in〉 =
∑
j
e2piijn/d |j〉 ⊗ |j + i1 mod d〉 ⊗ |j + i2 mod d〉 ⊗ · · · |j + in mod d〉 /
√
d
(43)
Similar analysis can be used, even if the dimension is not limited to 2, 3. If Eve wants
to measure the states without disturbing the system only if they are eigenstates of the
measuring operator, otherwise, she will produce errors at most of time. Meantime, Eve
can only guess the control key randomly, she has no means to decipher the control key.
In a word, the security of GCORE operation becomes better than ever. Like other QKD
protocols using orthogonal states, one distinct feature of our scheme is its high efficiency.
The information-theoretic efficiency defined in Ref.[16] is:
η =
bs
qt + bt
(44)
where bs is the number of secret bits received by Bob, qt is the number of qubits used, and bt
is the number of classical bits exchanged between Alice and Bob during the QKD process.
The efficiency of any protocol for QKD, defined as the number of secret (i.e. allowing
eavesdropping detection) bits per transmitted bit plus qubit, satisfies η ≤ 1. The protocol
presented here becomes 100%, because bs = d
N log2 d
N , qt = d
N log2 d
N , bt = 0. In this
way, we can calculate out that the efficiency of BB84 is 25%, similarly the EPR protocol
is 50%. To the best of our knowledge, only two protocols reach the limit value of η = 1,
one protocol by Cabello (high capacity Cabello protocol, HCCP) [16] and one by Long and
Liu (high capacity Long Liu protocol HCLLP) [17]. Both protocols exploit the fact that a
possible eavesdropper with no access to the whole quantum system at the same time, cannot
recover the whole information without being detected, and both employ a larger alphabet,
a few-dimensional orthogonal basis of pure state. The GCORE has the same characters, so
we can also obtain the full efficiency from this point of view.
Another feature of the scheme is its high capacity since the four possible states of the
EPR pairs carry two bits of information(log2 4 = 2), eight possible states of GHZ-basis
states carry three bits of information(log2 2
3 = 3). Similarly, the nine possible states of
the 2-qutrit general Bell-basis states carry log2 9 bits of information, the 27 possible states
of the 3-qutrit general maximally entangled basis states carry log2 3
3 bits of information,
so we can think the possible states of the N -qudit maximally entangled basis state carry
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log2 d
N bits of information. In short, M adopted N -qudit maximally entangled state can
send M log2 d
N bits of information in our GCORE scheme. On average, per particle of
GCORE protocol carries (log2 d
N)/NdN bits of information. Whereas in the EPR scheme
(BB84) each adopted EPR pair (particles) carried only one bit of information, that is, 0.5
bit information per particle carries. But if we use the control key to control the GCORE
operation of a group of units. We can save a large amount of resources. From this sense, we
think the proposed scheme is better.
In QKD, our scheme is just one-to-one protocol, there are other protocols using different
ways to distribute secret keys [1-3,6,7-17]. As we know, Townsend’s protocol [30] is a one-
to-any protocol, where Alice acts as a single controller to establish and update a distinct
secret key with each network user. An any-to-any protocol has been proposed to allow
any two users to establish a secret key over an optical network by Phoenix et al.[31]. The
present scheme can be generalized to distribute secret keys to multiple legitimate users. It
is different from Townsend and Phoenix’s protocol in that the secret keys are common to all
legitimate users. The procedure is given in the following. We demonstrate it using EPR pair
for simplicity, after Alice has sent the keys to Bob, Bob can create an EPR pair sequence
that carries the raw keys. Then he sends this EPR pair sequence to another legitimate
user, Clare, using the same procedure and device as before. The key protocols common to
Alice, Bob and Clare are those Bell-basis measurement results that are not chosen to check
eavesdropping. In this way, the protocol can be generalized to a multiparty common key
distribution protocol. Note that all of the GCORE protocols have a final step, i.e. error
correction and privacy amplification [30], we shall not discuss these points, which are the
same as in all cryptographic protocols, except that we have to use qutrits (qudits) instead
of bits, and therefore parity checks becomes triality checks, that is sums of modulo3 (d).
In summary, we extend the idea of CORE to N -qubit, N -qutrit quantum systems,
propose the detailed protocols and give the corresponding security analysis of 3-qubit,
2-qutrit maximally entangled states, finally, we obtain the GCORE using the general
expression of multi-particle and high dimension maximally entangled basis state by using
repeatedly a prior shared control key in this paper. The generalized version has great
capacity and high efficiency. In addition, the control key can be used to control the GCORE
operation of a group of units, so it greatly simplifies the experimental realization and
enables quantum key distribution in a more efficient way.
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